

**Suspend the Rules and Pass the Bill, H. R. 3202, With an
Amendment**

**(The amendment strikes all after the enacting clause and inserts a
complete new text)**

118TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 3202

To prohibit any official action to recognize or normalize relations with any
Government of Syria that is led by Bashar al-Assad, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 11, 2023

Mr. WILSON of South Carolina (for himself, Mr. VICENTE GONZALEZ of
Texas, Mr. McCAUL, Mr. HILL, Mr. BOYLE of Pennsylvania, Mrs.
RADEWAGEN, Mr. COHEN, and Mr. GIMENEZ) introduced the following
bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in ad-
dition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently
determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provi-
sions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To prohibit any official action to recognize or normalize
relations with any Government of Syria that is led by
Bashar al-Assad, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Assad Regime Anti-
3 Normalization Act of 2023”.

4 **SEC. 2. MODIFICATIONS TO THE CAESAR SYRIA CIVILIAN**
5 **PROTECTION ACT.**

6 (a) CAESAR SYRIA CIVILIAN PROTECTION ACT.—
7 Section 7412 of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act
8 of 2019 (title LXXIV of the National Defense Authoriza-
9 tion Act for Fiscal Year 2020; 22 U.S.C. 8791 note) is
10 amended—

11 (1) in subsection (a)—

12 (A) in paragraph (1), by striking “the
13 President shall impose” and all that follows
14 through the end of the paragraph and inserting
15 “the President—”

16 “(A) shall impose the sanctions described
17 in subsection (b) with respect to a foreign per-
18 son that the President determines—

19 “(i) knowingly engages, on or after
20 such date of enactment, in an activity de-
21 scribed in paragraph (2);

22 “(ii) is an adult family member of a
23 foreign person described in clause (i), un-
24 less the President determines there is clear
25 and convincing evidence that such adult
26 family member has disassociated them-

1 selves from the foreign person described in
2 such clause and has no history of helping
3 such foreign person conceal assets; or

4 “(iii) is owned or controlled by a for-
5 eign person described in clause (i) or (ii);
6 and

7 “(B) may impose the sanctions described
8 in subsection (b) with respect to a foreign per-
9 son that the President determines knowingly
10 provides, on or after such date of enactment,
11 significant financial, material, or technological
12 support to a foreign person engaging in an ac-
13 tivity described in any of subparagraphs (B)
14 through (H) of paragraph (2);”.

15 (B) in paragraph (2)—

16 (i) in subparagraph (A)—

17 (I) by amending clause (i) to
18 read as follows:

19 “(i) the Government of Syria (includ-
20 ing any entity owned or controlled by the
21 Government of Syria), a senior political
22 figure of the Government of Syria, a mem-
23 ber of the People’s Assembly of Syria, or
24 a senior foreign political figure (as such
25 term is defined in section 101.605 of title

1 31, Code of Federal Regulations) of the
2 Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party of Syria, in-
3 cluding any such senior foreign political
4 figure who is—

5 “(I) a member of the Central
6 Command, Central Committee, or Au-
7 diting and Inspection Committee of
8 such Party; or

9 “(II) a leader of a local branch of
10 such Party;”;

11 (II) in clause (ii), by striking “;
12 or” and inserting a semicolon;

13 (III) in clause (iii), by striking
14 the semicolon and inserting “; or”;
15 and

16 (IV) by adding at the end the fol-
17 lowing new clause:

18 “(iv) Syria Arab Airlines, Cham
19 Wings, or any foreign person owned or
20 controlled by Syria Arab Airlines or Cham
21 Wings;”;

22 (ii) by amending subparagraph (C) to
23 read as follows:

24 “(C) knowingly sells or provides aircraft or
25 spare aircraft parts—

1 “(i) to the Government of Syria; or

2 “(ii) for or on behalf of the Govern-
3 ment of Syria to any foreign person oper-
4 ating in an area directly or indirectly con-
5 trolled by the Government of Syria or for-
6 eign forces associated with the Government
7 of Syria;”;

8 (iii) in subparagraph (D), by striking
9 “; or” and inserting a semicolon;

10 (iv) in subparagraph (E)—

11 (I) by striking “construction or
12 engineering services” and inserting
13 “construction, engineering, or com-
14 mercial financial services”; and

15 (II) by striking the closing period
16 and inserting a semicolon; and

17 (v) by adding at the end the following
18 new subparagraphs:

19 “(F) purposefully engages in or directs—

20 “(i) the diversion of goods (including
21 agricultural commodities, food, medicine,
22 and medical devices), or any international
23 humanitarian assistance, intended for the
24 people of Syria; or

1 “(ii) the dealing in proceeds from the
2 sale or resale of such diverted goods or
3 international humanitarian assistance, as
4 the case may be;

5 “(G) knowingly, directly or indirectly, en-
6 gages in or attempts to engage in, the seizure,
7 confiscation, theft, or expropriation for personal
8 gain or political purposes of property, including
9 real property, in Syria or owned by a citizen of
10 Syria;

11 “(H) knowingly, directly or indirectly, en-
12 gages in or attempts to engage in a transaction
13 or transactions for or with such seized, con-
14 fiscated, stolen, or expropriated property de-
15 scribed in subparagraph (G); or

16 “(I) knowingly provides significant finan-
17 cial, material, or technological support to a for-
18 eign person engaging in an activity described in
19 subparagraph (A).”; and

20 (C) by adding at the end the following new
21 paragraphs:

22 “(4) TRANSACTION DEFINED.—For purposes of
23 the determination required by subparagraph
24 (a)(2)(A), the term ‘transaction’ includes in-kind
25 transactions.

1 “(5) ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS.—In this sec-
2 tion:

3 “(A) COMMERCIAL FINANCIAL SERV-
4 ICES.—The term ‘commercial financial services’
5 means any transaction between the Government
6 of Syria and a foreign bank or foreign financial
7 institution operating in an area under the con-
8 trol of the Government of Syria that has a valu-
9 ation of more than \$5,000,000.

10 “(B) FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term
11 ‘financial institution’ means a financial institu-
12 tion specified in any of subparagraphs (A)
13 through (K), (M), (N), (P), (R), (T), (Y), or
14 (Z) of section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United
15 States Code.

16 “(6) SIGNIFICANT TRANSACTION CLARIFIED.—
17 In this section, the term ‘significant transaction’ in-
18 cludes any natural gas, electricity, or other energy-
19 related transaction.”; and

20 (2) by adding at the end the following new sub-
21 section:

22 “(c) CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTS.—Not later than
23 120 days after receiving a request from the chairman and
24 ranking member of one of the appropriate congressional
25 committees with respect to whether a foreign person know-

1 ingly engages in an activity described in subsection (a)(2)
2 the President shall—

3 “(1) make the determination specified in sub-
4 section (a)(1) with respect to that foreign person;
5 and

6 “(2) submit to such chairman and ranking
7 member that submitted the request a report with re-
8 spect to such determination that includes a state-
9 ment of whether the President has imposed or in-
10 tends to impose the sanctions described in sub-
11 section (b) with respect to that foreign person.”.

12 (b) EXTENSION OF SUNSET.—Section 7438 of the
13 Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 is amended
14 by striking “the date that is 5 years after the date of the
15 enactment of this Act” and inserting “December 31,
16 2032”.

17 (c) DETERMINATIONS WITH RESPECT TO SYRIA
18 TRUST FOR DEVELOPMENT.—

19 (1) DETERMINATIONS.—Not later than 120
20 days after the enactment of this Act, the President
21 shall—

22 (A) determine whether the nonprofit orga-
23 nization chaired by Asma Al-Assad, the First
24 Lady of Syria, known as the “Syria Trust for

1 Development” meets the criteria for the imposi-
2 tion of sanctions—

3 (i) under section 7412(a) of the Cae-
4 sar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019,
5 as amended by subsection (a);

6 (ii) under Executive Order 13894 (84
7 Fed. Reg. 55851; relating to blocking
8 property and suspending entry of certain
9 persons contributing to the situation in
10 Syria); or

11 (iii) by nature of being owned or con-
12 trolled by a person designated under any
13 executive order or regulation administered
14 by the Office of Foreign Assets Control;
15 and

16 (B) submit to the appropriate congres-
17 sional committees each such determination, in-
18 cluding a justification for the determination.

19 (2) FORM.—The determination under para-
20 graph (1)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
21 but the justification specified in such paragraph may
22 be included in a classified annex. The unclassified
23 determination shall be made available on a publicly
24 available website of the Federal government.

1 (3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
2 TEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appro-
3 priate congressional committees” means—

4 (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the
5 Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Com-
6 mittee on Financial Services of the House of
7 Representatives; and

8 (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the
9 Committee on Foreign Relations and the Com-
10 mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
11 of the Senate.

12 (d) FINDINGS ON APPLICABILITY WITH RESPECT TO
13 SYRIAN ARAB AIRLINES, CHAM WINGS AIRLINES, AND
14 RELATED ENTITIES.—Congress finds the following:

15 (1) In 2013, the President identified Syrian
16 Arab Airlines as a blocked instrumentality or con-
17 trolled entity of the Government of Syria and con-
18 currently sanctioned Syrian Arab Airlines pursuant
19 to Executive Order 13224 for acting for or on behalf
20 of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods
21 Force of Iran.

22 (2) In 2016, the President sanctioned Syria-
23 based Cham Wings Airlines pursuant to Executive
24 Order 13582 for having materially assisted, spon-
25 sored, or provided financial, material, or techno-

1 logical support for, or goods or services in support
2 of, the Government of Syria and Syrian Arab Air-
3 lines.

4 (3) Section 7412(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Caesar
5 Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C.
6 8791 note) mandates the application of sanctions
7 against any foreign person that “knowingly provides
8 significant financial, material, or technological sup-
9 port to, or knowingly engages in a significant trans-
10 action with . . . a foreign person subject to sanc-
11 tions pursuant to the International Emergency Eco-
12 nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) with re-
13 spect to Syria or any other provision of law that im-
14 poses sanctions with respect to Syria,” which ap-
15 plies to airport service providers outside of Syria.

16 (e) SEVERABILITY.—If any provision of this Act, or
17 the application of such provision to any person or cir-
18 cumstance, is found to be unconstitutional, the remainder
19 of this Act, or the application of that provision to other
20 persons or circumstances, shall not be affected.

21 **SEC. 3. PROHIBITION OF RECOGNITION OF ASSAD REGIME.**

22 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
23 United States—

24 (1) not to recognize or normalize relations with
25 any Government of Syria that is led by Bashar al-

1 Assad due to the Assad regime’s ongoing crimes
2 against the Syrian people, including failure to meet
3 the criteria outlined in section 7431(a) of the Caesar
4 Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019;

5 (2) to actively oppose recognition or normaliza-
6 tion of relations by other governments with any Gov-
7 ernment of Syria that is led by Bashar Al-Assad, in-
8 cluding by fully implementing the mandatory pri-
9 mary and secondary sanctions in the Caesar Syria
10 Civilian Protection Act of 2019 and Executive Order
11 13894; and

12 (3) to use the full range of authorities, includ-
13 ing those provided under the Caesar Syria Civilian
14 Protection Act of 2019 and Executive Order 13894,
15 to deter reconstruction activities in areas under the
16 control of Bashar al-Assad.

17 (b) PROHIBITION.—In accordance with subsection
18 (a), no Federal official or employee may take any action,
19 and no Federal funds may be made available, to recognize
20 or otherwise imply, in any manner, United States recogni-
21 tion of Bashar al-Assad or any Government in Syria that
22 is led by Bashar al-Assad.

23 **SEC. 4. INTERAGENCY STRATEGY TO COUNTER NORMAL-**
24 **IZATION WITH ASSAD REGIME.**

25 (a) REPORT AND STRATEGY REQUIRED.—

1 (1) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 180 days
2 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
3 nually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State
4 (in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury,
5 the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Admin-
6 istration, and the heads of other appropriate Federal
7 departments and agencies) shall submit to the ap-
8 propriate congressional committees a report and
9 strategy to describe and counter actions taken or
10 planned by foreign governments to normalize, en-
11 gage with, or upgrade political, diplomatic, or eco-
12 nomic ties with the regime led by Bashar al-Assad
13 in Syria (in this section referred to as the “Assad
14 regime”).

15 (2) ELEMENTS.—The elements of the report
16 under paragraph (1) shall include—

17 (A) a description of violations of inter-
18 national law and human rights abuses com-
19 mitted by Bashar al-Assad, the Government of
20 the Russian Federation, or the Government of
21 Iran and progress towards justice and account-
22 ability for the Syrian people;

23 (B) a full list of diplomatic meetings at the
24 Ambassador level or above, between the Syrian
25 regime and any representative of the Govern-

1 ments of Turkey, the United Arab Emirates,
2 Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait,
3 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Algeria,
4 Morocco, Libya, or Lebanon, respectively;

5 (C) a list including an identification of—

6 (i) any single covered transaction ex-
7 ceeding \$500,000; and

8 (ii) any combination of covered trans-
9 actions by the same source that, in aggre-
10 gate, exceed \$500,000 and occur within a
11 single year;

12 (D) for each identified single transaction
13 or aggregate transactions, as the case may be,
14 included in the list described in subparagraph
15 (C), a determination of whether such trans-
16 action subjects any of the parties to the trans-
17 action to sanctions under the Caesar Syria Ci-
18 vilian Protection Act of 2019, as amended by
19 section 2;

20 (E) a description of the steps the United
21 States is taking to actively deter recognition or
22 normalization of relations by other governments
23 with the Assad regime, including specific diplo-
24 matic engagements and use of economic sanc-

1 tions authorized by statutes or implemented
2 through Executive Orders, including—

3 (i) the Caesar Syria Civilian Protec-
4 tion Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 8791 note);

5 (ii) the Syria Accountability and Leb-
6 anese Sovereignty Restoration Act (22
7 U.S.C. 2151 note);

8 (iii) the Comprehensive Iran Sanc-
9 tions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
10 of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.);

11 (iv) Executive Order 13894 (84 Fed.
12 Reg. 55851; relating to blocking property
13 and suspending entry of certain persons
14 contributing to the situation in Syria);

15 (v) the Global Magnitsky Human
16 Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C.
17 10101 et seq.);

18 (vi) the Countering America’s Adver-
19 saries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C.
20 9401 et seq.); and

21 (vii) the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
22 Designation Act (21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.);
23 and

24 (F) an assessment of how recognition or
25 normalization of relations by other governments

1 with the Assad regime impacts the national se-
2 curity of the United States, prospects for imple-
3 mentation of the United Nations Security
4 Council Resolution 2254, prospects for justice
5 and accountability for war crimes in Syria, and
6 the benefits derived by the Government of the
7 Russian Federation or the Government of Iran.

8 (b) SCOPE.—The initial report required by subsection
9 (a) shall address the period beginning on January 1, 2021,
10 and ending on the date of the enactment of this Act, and
11 each subsequent report shall address the one-year period
12 following the conclusion of the scope of the prior report.

13 (c) FORM.—Each report under subsection (a) shall
14 be submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a
15 classified annex. The unclassified section of such a report
16 shall be made publicly available on a website of the United
17 States Federal Government.

18 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—
19 In this section, the term “appropriate congressional com-
20 mittees” means—

21 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
22 Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Fi-
23 nancial Services, the Committee on Appropriations,
24 and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
25 of the House of Representatives; and

1 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
2 Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on
3 Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Com-
4 mittee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee
5 on Intelligence of the Senate.

6 (e) COVERED TRANSACTION DEFINED.—In this sec-
7 tion, the term “covered transaction” means a transaction,
8 including an investment, grant, contract, or donation (in-
9 cluding a loan or other extension of credit)—

10 (1) by a foreign person located in Turkey, the
11 United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Oman,
12 Bahrain, Kuwait, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Tu-
13 nisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, or Lebanon; to

14 (2) a recipient in any area of Syria held by the
15 Assad regime.

16 **SEC. 5. REPORTS ON MANIPULATION OF UNITED NATIONS**
17 **BY ASSAD REGIME IN SYRIA.**

18 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
19 ment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the
20 Secretary of State, shall submit to the Committee on For-
21 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Com-
22 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the
23 manipulation of the United Nations by the regime led by
24 Bashar al-Assad in Syria (in this section referred to as
25 the “Assad regime”), including—

1 (1) a description of conditions, both explicit and
2 implicit, set by the Assad regime with respect to
3 United Nations operations in Syria including with
4 respect to implementing partners, hiring practices,
5 allocation of grants and contracts, and procurement
6 of goods and services;

7 (2) a description of the extent to which the
8 United Nations has rejected or otherwise opposed
9 any of the conditions described in paragraph (1);

10 (3) an identification of officials or employees of
11 the United Nations (including funds, programs and
12 specialized agencies of the United Nations) with ties
13 to the Assad regime, including family ties, or per-
14 sons designated for sanctions by United Nations
15 donor countries;

16 (4) a full account of access restrictions imposed
17 by the Assad regime and the overall impact on the
18 ability of the United Nations to deliver international
19 assistance to target beneficiaries in areas outside re-
20 gime control;

21 (5) a description of ways in which United Na-
22 tions aid improperly benefits the Assad regime and
23 its associates in defiance of basic humanitarian prin-
24 ciples;

1 (6) a description of the due diligence mecha-
2 nisms and vetting procedures in place to ensure enti-
3 ties contracted by the United Nations to ensure
4 goods, supplies, or services provided to Syria do not
5 have links to the Assad regime, known human rights
6 abusers, or persons designated for sanctions by
7 United Nations donor countries;

8 (7) an identification of entities affiliated with
9 the Assad regime, including the Syria Trust for De-
10 velopment and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, for-
11 eign government ministries, and private corporations
12 owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the
13 Assad regime, that have received United Nations
14 funding, contracts, or grants or have otherwise en-
15 tered into a formalized partnership with the United
16 Nations;

17 (8) an assessment of how the Assad regime sets
18 arbitrary or punitive exchange rates to extract fund-
19 ing from the United Nations, as well as the total
20 amount extracted by such means;

21 (9) an assessment of the degree to which the
22 various forms of manipulation described in this sec-
23 tion has resulted in compromises of the humani-
24 tarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impar-
25 tiality, and independence of the United Nations; and

1 (10) a strategy to reduce the ability of the
2 Assad regime to manipulate or otherwise influence
3 the United Nations and other aid operations in
4 Syria and ensure United States and international
5 aid is delivered in a neutral and impartial manner
6 consistent with basic humanitarian principles.